Although the departure of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on a state visis to New Delhi on 8 December made it very unlikely that the Soviet Union would intervene in the short term, at least ultil his return, the Carter Administration continued quite properly to sound the alarm. State and Defence Department officials noted on 8 December that East German and Czechoslovak forces had also been brought up to a leve of readiness that would allow them to intervene at a moment's notice. State Department officials noted that such an intervention would most likely come in the guise of Warsaw Pact military manouevres, which they said would be just as unacceptable as a direct invasion. Significantly, officials said that the Administration wished to avoid repetition of what happened in 1968 Czechoslovak crisis when Western intelligence had information indicating a Soviet invasion was possible not make it public. Brzezinski noted his own operation approach in his journal entry of 8 December:
"I see four objectives to what we are doing one is to deprive the Soviets of surprise. This we have already done. Two, perheaps to encourage the Poles to resist if they are not taken by surprise, for this might somewhat deter the Soviets. The publicity is already doing that. Thirdly and paradoxically, to calm the situation in Poland by making the Poles more aware that the Soviets may in fact enter. The Poles have till now discounted this possibility and this may have emboldened them excessively. Here in effect we have a common interest with the Soviets, for they too may prefer to intimidade the Poles to a degree. And fourth, to deter the Soviets from coming in by intensifying international pressure and condemnation of the Soviet Union."
Meanwhile, however, the Pentagon's only immediate military signial in response to the powerful Soviet moves was to state that NATO's six-ship Atlantic squadron would not put into port for the Christmas holidays. Nonetheless, the Administration did approach Lave Kirkland, head of the AFL-CIO concerning the possibility of he boycott on shipments to the USSR, while Brzezinski ordered the Pentagon, in a memo he assumed would become public, to prepare lists of weapons to sell to People's Republic of China in event of a Soviet invasion of Poland.
These were in fact the irst salvos by the Administration in increasingly clear series of signals to the Soviet leaders of the costs to them of any military intervention - the so-called 'stick' approach. They were followed rapidly by mustering of NATO-wide for such strategy by secretary of State Edmund Muskie. At the winter NATO meeting, which began on 9 December, the Allies considered a range of contingengy steps to be taken in the event of an invasion: 1) increased defence expenditurees; 2) cessation of credits to Poland and the USSR; 3) Cancellation of high technology exchanges, such as the gas pipeline deal; 4) closure of Western ports to Soviet vessels; 5) cancellation of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks; 6) walkout on the ongoing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) deliberations; 7) cessation of cultural exchanges; 8) recall of ambassadors and 9) reduction of the Western missions in Moscow. The Ministers also agreed to meet upon the further deterioration of the situation to decide upon appropriate responses. Certainly the range of responses considered was significant, albeit glaringly lacking in more sweeping economic of political measures; although, as Muskie declared, 'no one at this point has evaluated them in terms of package depending on alternative senarios'. Nonetheless, he noted tht the atitude of the NATO Ministers was 'very strong, positive and unanimous' and that all agreed that economic sanctions would be necessary. Indicative were the remarks of Jean François-Ponçet, Foreing Minister of France who stated:
"It would be very wrong to think the economic and industrial interests of the European countries would stop them from drawing the necessary conclusions from extremely grave actions."
Overall, these were fairly powerful declaratory signals to the Soviet leadership, particularly as they involved a degree of public commitment by the west that concrete sanctions would likely be undertaken in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland. It is unlikey that these signals could have been the decisive element in the decision-making of the Soviet leadershp-vis-à-vis the invsion option, but they may have greatly strengthened the hands of those Kremlin leaders arguing agains such a move for reasons of bureaucratic or personal interest.
Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis - By: T. Cynkin
Former Chatham House Fellow Mark Curtis unearthed heavily censored, partly declassified files in which UF Foreign Office Ministers, indlucind Alec Douglas-Home, complained that if Yemen fell from the sphere of British influence, other sheikhdoms, like Oman and the UAE, would be inspired to revolt and Britain's 'credibility' would be damaged. In response to the Radfan rebellion, High Comissioner, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, suggested to the British mercenary forces that 'put the fear of death into the [Yemeni] villagers' with air raids, which not suit us too badly if [Yemenis] were occupied with their own internal affairs during the next few years'. As we shall see, this divide and conquer strategy operates today.
After 'Al-Qaeda'
From 1962, Britain ran a covert mercenary war in Yemen, in which a staggering 200,000 people died in an eight year period, many from chemichal weapons - Phosgene - produced by the tax-funded Porton Down Laboratories (the UK's biochemichal warfare plant). The operations were tun by MI6 head, Dick White, and former MI6 Vice Chief turned banker George Young, via the latter's Mossad-allied proxy, Neil McLean.
By the late-1970, the CIA and MI6 were training fascistic Yemeni collaborators to 'dwar the Russians into the Afghan trap', in the words of US president Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The plan worked. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the deaths of around 1 million Afghans and drove a flood of refugees into Pakistan (some of whom later became the Taliban). These were just 'a few stirred-up Moslems' (Brzezinski). According to New Labour's Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 'al-Qaeda' exists in name only and means 'the database' or 'computer file' of tens of thousands of Arab mujahideen terrorists whom the US Navy SEALS, Green Berets and CIA, and the UK SAS and MI6 were training in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s.
Britain's Secret Wars: How and why the United Kingdom sponsors conflict around the world - by: T. J. Coles
When Jimmy Carter became President in 1977, Zbigniew Brzezinski became National Security Adviser, and Samuel Huntington became Coordinatior of Natioanl Security and Deputy to Brzezinski. In 1978, Brzezinski argued that an "arc of crisis" was stretching from Indochina to southern Africa and that the particular area of focus was consisting of the nations that were stretching across the southern flank of Soviet Union from the India subcontinent to Turkey, and southward through the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa. Moreover according to Brzezinski, the "center of gravity" of the aforementioned "arc of crisis" was Iran, but the thirty-seven-year reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was almost over. Reza Pahlavi's reign, which had been extremely benevolent to U.S., ended in February 1979 by montos of civil unrest and revolution. With rising discontent in the region. Brzezinski argued that Islamic forces should be used against Soviet Union, and George Ball, who was the head of special White House Iran wask force under Brzezinski, recommended that U.S. government should drop support for the Shah of Iran, and it should support the fundamentalist Islamic oposition of Ayatollah Khomeini. Covertly, the U.S. helped a radical Shia government under Ayatollah Khomeini to come to power in Iran, the "center of gravity" of the aforementioned "arc of crisis", and soon after ward, in April 1980, the U.S. implementing its own "divide and conquer" strategy, induced the Sunni regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, thus strirring up a war in the region.
In 1978, as Taraki's socielist government came to power in Afghanistan, almost immediately the U.S. becan covertly funding the revel groups through CIA. On July 3, 1979, U.S. President Carter signed the first derective for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, and very day, Brzezinski wrote a note to the U.S. president he explained to him that the U.S. aid to Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan was going to induce a Soviet military interventon. For a long period of time, in Afghanistan and the Soviet Muslim Republics, the dominand form of Islam had been local and mainly Sufi. But during the Afghan war of the 1980s, British and U.S. intelligence agencies deepend their alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, ad this spawned Al Qaeda and several groups that were foreign fighters brought to Afghanistan as "mujahideen" trained and armed to fight the "godless" Soviet regime. Robin Cook a former British MP and Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote thousands of mujahideen who were recrruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians.
The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan promoted the U.S. national Security establishment to unedertake a colossal covert operation, in the context of which the CIA Direction William J. Casey cooperated with Saudi PRince Turki bin Faisal, who was the Director of General of Saudi Arabia's intelligence agency, and with Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI) in order to created a foreign legion of jihadists, an idea that had originated in the Safari Club. More than 100.000 hihadists were trained in Pakistan between 1986 and 1992, in camps overseen by U.S. and the British intelligence agencies, wchich trained future Al Qaeda en Taliban fighters in bomb-making and terrorism. Osama bin Laden was a major sponsor of jihadists in Pakistan, he was recruited bu CIA in 1979 in Istanbum, he had the close support to Prince Turki bin Faisal (i.e., the head of Saudi intelligence) and he developed tics with Hekmatyar in Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA began funding Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami mujahideen organization through the Pakistani intelligence agency.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and arm of the Al Qaeda created by Afghan fighters who returned to Lybia after the Soviet withdrawal by Afghanistan, is exemplary of the spreading of neo-Salafist problem that emerged ot of the Western plan to play Islamic movements against the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the West in general and the United Stated in particular became the new target of the radicalized Muslims.
In the early 1990's, a Pashtun community known as teh Taliban was a powerful military and political force in Afghanistan. In 1994 and 1995, the Taliban acquired a strong alliance with Pakistan's intelligence agency, and, between 1994 and 1996, te U.S. supported the Taliban through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, because Washington viewed Taliban as a force that could balance Iran in Central Asia and a pro-Western movement. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, the neoconservative Jamestown Foundation, the Caucasus Fund of Georgia (a group affiliated with Jamestown Foundation)m and other groups funded bu the U.S. Agency for International Develpment (USAID) and by George Soros's Open Society Institute attemped to destablize the Russian Federation by the Radicalization of Muslim Inhabitants of the Caucasus region and inducing them to declare independence from Moscow and to forge close ties with the U.S. controlled Wahhabi governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar
The Metaphysics of World Order: A Synthesis of Philosophy, Theology, and Politics - By: Nicolas Laos
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